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Court of Appeals Jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction correct pursuant to Utah Code 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
Issues on Appeal 
1. Whether sanctions against BYU should have been imposed where (1) BYU 
removed the underlying state court case to federal court in violation of 28 
U.S.C. §1441 where no federal cause of action existed, which improper 
removal forced the state court case to be stayed, which stay resulted in a 1 
year delay prior to federal court remanding the state court case and (2) for 
the manner in which they obtained an arrest warrant for appellant, violating 
URPC 3.3(d) and falsely telling the judge that URCP 69 provided the 
necessary authority for their motion? 
2. Whether Appellant should have been sanctioned $4748.15 by the lower 
court judge when he complained about the improper removal and sought 
sanctions for the improper removal, and for the manner in which BYU 
obtained the civil arrest warrant for Appellant? 
3. Whether the trial court judge should have rescinded the arrest warrant for 
Appellant for his missing the supplemental hearing for BYU to collect the 
$2791.75 sanction, when the trial court found out (1) that Appellant, who 
resides in California, was homeless, near penniless, and as a result could not 
travel to the supplemental hearing, where the trial court judge was fully 
informed, under oath, Appellant's financial condition via affidavit (2) that 
URPC 3.3 was violated in obtaining the arrest warrant and (3) that URCP 
69 upon which the Order was based does not exist? 
4. Whether BYU violated the Utah Rules of Professional conduct in (1) 
appearing ex parte before the trial court judge, and obtaining an Order 
requiring Appellant to personally appear at a supplemental hearing in Utah 
to collect the $2791.75, or face arrest, where BYU was perfectly aware that 
Appellant was homeless, not having the financial means to travel to that 
supplemental hearing, where BYU failed to inform the trial court judge that 
Appellant did not have the means to travel to Utah and was in fact homeless 
- guaranteeing them the arrest warrant, where URPC 3.3 (d) requires BYU 
to inform the trial court judge of all of the pertinent facts needed for him to 
make a just determination in an ex parte proceeding; (2) in misleading the 
trial court judge that Utah R. Civ. Proc. 69 allowed for such a motion where 
Utah R. Civ. Proc. 69 in fact does not exist; (3) in abusing the ex parte 
proceeding process to obtain the Order leading to the arrest warrant where 
no compelling or unique circumstances warranted an ex parte proceeding, 
allowing BYU to secure the Order leading to the arrest warrant unopposed? 
5. Whether Due Process of Law under the Utah Constitution was violated by 
the manner in which the Order and arrest warrant were obtained in (4) 
above? 
6. Whether a one year delay caused by defendant's improper removal to 
federal court of the state case where Appellant was barred by law from 
filing any motions in the state case until remand, should be counted by the 
trial judge against a plaintiff in denying an opportunity to amend the 
complaint due to it being untimely as a result of the one year delay, where 
opportunity to amend would have been liberally allowed under URCP 15(a) 
had the 1 year delay not occurred? 
7. Whether the complaint as amended or as could be amended, states an 
actionable claim for relief? 
8. Whether the Appellant should be allowed a new judge on remand? 
Standard of Review 
Issues 1-4, 6, 8 - Abuse of Discretion.; Featherstone v. Schaerrer, 34 P.3d 
194. 
Issues 5, 7 -De Novo, viewing facts in a light most favorable to Appellant. 
Mackey v. Cannon, 996 P.2d 1081. 
Issues Preserved On Appeal 
Issue 1 - See Rulings of the Court at R. 192,193, 172 (showing that a 
motion for sanctions was in fact submitted to the court - which for some reason is 
now lost from the record) See also Reply Re: Motion for Sanctions For 
Unnecessary Delay R. 164-162. Appellant has motion to correct the record to 
include the missing document which was supplied by counsel for BYU. 
Issue 2 - BYU sought sanctions in a motion to reconsider (R. 154 - a short 
paragraph); See Appellant's Reply. R. 164-162. 
Issue 3 - R. 274 -268; 288 
Issue 4 - R. 296 - 295; R. 393 - 427. 
Issue 6-R. 128; 
Issue 7-R. 251-338 
Issue 8-R. 319 
Issue 5 - The Constitutionality of the Arrest Warrant was not specifically 
raised in the court below on those grounds; the Order had actually been issued 
prior to any opportunity to raise the objections in the court below. It was, after the 
Order was issued, objected to but not specifically on due process of law grounds; 
mainly it was challenged, after it was issued on the fact that Rule 69 did not exist 
and URPC 3.3 mandate disclosure of Appellant's inability to travel to Utah where 
BYU was fully aware that Appellant's inability to make it to the hearing would 
automatically guarantee them an arrest warrant. Due process of law requires some 
R 
notice and opportunity to be heard and in the particular ex parte proceeding such 
due process of law was denied. 
Statutes, Rules, Constitutional Provisions 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c) 
(b) Representations to court. By presenting a pleading, written motion, or 
other paper to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later 
advocating), an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best 
of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry 
reasonable under the circumstances, 
(b)(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass 
or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; 
(b)(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are 
warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law; 
(b)(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support 
or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a 
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and 
(b)(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if 
specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or 
belief. 
(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the 
court determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, 
subject to the conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon 
the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are 
responsible for the violation. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 69 
Abrogated. 
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 3.3 - Candor Toward the Tribunal. 
(d) In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all 
material facts known to the lawyer that will enable the tribunal to make an 
informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse. 
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28 U.S.C. §1441 
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil 
action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United 
States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the 
defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and 
division embracing the place where such action is pending. *** 
Statement of the Case 
Nature of the Case 
The underlying case included claims for false light, defamation, negligence, 
breach of fiduciary duty and violation of equal protection of laws under the Utah 
Constitution. 
Course of the Proceedings 
After filing the complaint (R. 12), BYU removed the case to federal court 
(R. 57) where it was held that it was not removable due to a lack of any federal 
cause of action existing in the case as required for removal by 28 U.S.C. §1441 (R. 
140). Appellant immediately filed a motion to remand in federal court, made 
several phone calls to the federal judge's law clerk to make sure that got done, but 
the case did not get remanded for one year (R. 94). 
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At that time Appellant sought to amend the complaint unaware that a 
previous judge had allowed an amended complaint right before the case was 
removed1. 
BYU did not oppose the motion to amend the complaint and Appellant filed 
a motion to submit for decision on March 16, 2004 (R. 109). 
Appellant also filed a motion for sanctions related to the 1 year delay of the 
case due to the improper removal to federal court against the plain language of 28 
U.S.C. §1441 but the motion initially was "respectfully" denied (R. 172) but the 
judge later changed his position after BYU sought attorney fees related to the 
motion for sanctions, and fined Appellant $2791.75 saying the motion for 
sanctions was now frivolous, meriting monetary penalties (R. 192). 
Two months after the filing of the motion to submit for decision for the 
amending of the complaint, BYU, without giving any basis for the delay, 
responded and objected to any amendment (R. 126). The judge then allowed the 
amended complaint (R. 172) but BYU filed a motion to reconsider (R. 176) and 
the judge then denied the amended complaint based on the untimely objection filed 
to it by BYU and additionally awarded attorney fees to BYU (R. 195). 
Appellant filed a his own motion to reconsider (R. 201) the imposition of 
monetary penalties along with his denial of the amended complaint due to it being 
sought over 1 year into the proceedings (which resulted from BYU tying the case 
1
 Appellant became aware of that prior to filing this appeal when he saw the docket 
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up for 1 year in federal court on a wrongful removal) but the judge simply imposed 
further monetary sanctions (R. 226). 
Appellant appealed to this Court the imposition of the $2791.75 sanction 
(R. 266) but this Court held that the sanction was not appealable until the entire 
case had terminated (20050549-CA). Appellant also sought a stay in the trial court 
of enforcing the sanction. (R. 267) 
BYU then went before the trial court and claiming authority in URCP 69 
which actually does not exist, obtained - ex parte - an Order requiring Appellant to 
appear in Utah for a supplemental hearing to collect the $2791.75 or face arrest. 
(R. 276-285) BYU was aware that Appellant was homeless in California and did 
not have the means to travel to Utah (R. 295-296; 422-427) but failed to disclose 
that to the trial judge when seeking the Order leading to Appellant's arrest warrant. 
(R. 276-285) 
Appellant was unable to make it to Utah for the hearing and a warrant for 
his arrest was issued by Judge Howard. (R. 293). 
Appellant filed numerous motions to attempt to prevent and rescind the 
arrest warrant (R. 266; 267; 288; 315 ) but each were denied and the arrest warrant 
remains in effect. (R. 484; 429). Further Amending of the Complaint was also 
denied and the case dismissed. (R. 484; 429). 
Disposition in Court Below 
sheet. Apparently the Order allowing the amended complaint went to an incorrect 
Q 
Dismissed w/ prejudice; arrest warrant and sanctions remain in place. 
Factual Background 
With respect the actual merits of the complaint, BYU in concert with their 
state actor police published false and defamatory articles on two occasions of and 
concerning Appellant. One was a fabricated "police beat" article by the BYU 
police where the police fabricated an incident and published in the school 
newspaper on or about September, 1999. {Second Amended Complaint R. 60-75 
(SAC) 1flfll-l8) 3 months later BYU acknowledged the "error" and printed a 
retraction of the police beat article (SAC \16 - R. 21) 
BYU police on or about 29 August 2000 next provided information to the 
school newspaper of and concerning Appellant which was false and BYU 
published on its internet site that Appellant had been convicted of criminal 
trespassing at BYU which was false. (SAC fflf 20-26). 
Appellant returned to school to BYU spring 2002 and at that time was 
unreasonably seized by the BYU police on 2 occasions as a student. SAC 
ffl[29(b)(c). Two other times off of campus, October 2000 Appellant was detained 
until he produced ID while sitting in his car to the south of campus and breaking 
no laws, or suspected of doing so. SAC \32. On the other occasion Appellant was 
detained April 2002 in a Provo City Public Park parking lot by BYU police where 
Appellant was breaking no laws. SAC p 5 . 
address. 
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Also, while a student spring 2002 a security guard supervised by the BYU 
police entered the computer lab where Appellant and one of his classmates were 
working on homework. The classmate was a former roommate and friend. 
Appellant left the computer lab but stopped outside the doorway and listened to the 
conversation and the student security guard began relating to Appellant's 
classmate some 10 things the police dispatch had no Appellant. SAC UK39-42. 
That destroyed the friendship and forced Appellant to take the final exam in 
the class outside of that classmates presence due to the bad feelings that ensued. 
SAC1f42. 
Appellant maintained that the facts as alleged constituted claims for 
defamation (SAC 1HJ45-48), false light (SAC HH45-48), false imprisonment (SAC 
1f1}49-54) and in the proposed amended complaint denial of equal protection of 
laws against the Utah Constitution regarding the police conduct, breach of 
fiduciary duty and negligence. R. 340-342. 
Summary of the Argument 
1. The arrest warrant was improperly obtained and based on a sanction which 
was completely unfounded and both must be vacated. BYU deserved 
sanctions because the plain language of 28 U.S.C. §1441 showed the case 
could not be removed to federal court and a reasonable attorney would have 
read 28 U.S.C. §1441; the 1 year resulting delay was in fact prejudicial to 
Appellant's case. 
2. BYU violated the Utah Rules of Professional conduct 3.3 (d) in (1) 
appearing ex parte before the trial court judge, and obtaining an Order 
requiring Appellant to personally appear at a supplemental hearing in Utah 
to collect the $2791.75, or face arrest, where BYU was perfectly aware that 
Appellant was homeless, not having the financial means to travel to that 
supplemental hearing, where BYU failed to inform the trial court judge that 
Appellant did not have the means to travel to Utah and was in fact 
homeless, where URPC 3.3 (d) requires BYU to inform the trial court judge 
of all of the pertinent facts needed for him to make a just determination in 
an ex parte proceeding; (2) in misleading the trial court judge that Utah R. 
Civ. Proc. 69 allowed for such a motion where Utah R. Civ. Proc. 69 in 
fact does not exist; (3) in abusing the ex parte proceeding process to obtain 
the Order leading to the arrest warrant where no compelling or unique 
circumstances warranted an ex parte proceeding, allowing BYU to secure 
the Order leading to the arrest warrant unopposed. Due Process of Law 
under the Utah Constitution was violated by the manner in which the Order 
and arrest warrant was obtained. 
3. A one year delay caused by defendant's improper removal to federal court 
of the state case where Appellant was barred by law from filing any motions 
in the state case until remand, should not be counted by the trial judge 
against a plaintiff in denying an opportunity to amend the complaint. BYU 
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should have been barred from contesting amendment as they waited over 2 
months after the motion to submit for decision to object. 
4. The complaint as amended, or as could be amended, states at least one 
actionable claim for relief. 
5. Appellant should be allowed a new judge on remand. 
Argument 
I. 
The sanctions against Appellant were unfounded 
and therefore must be vacated. 
28 U.S.C. §1441 states in pertinent part: 
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil 
action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United 
States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the 
defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and 
division embracing the place where such action is pending. 
According to §1441, the statute upon which BYU relied to remove the case 
to federal court, the state case can not be removed unless the state cause of action 
could have originally been filed in federal court. 
The state court case, however, contains claims for defamation, false light 
and false imprisonment. R. 60-64. These are obviously state tort claims. Federal 
Court does not have jurisdiction over state tort claims standing by themselves. 
Supplemental jurisdiction per 28 U.S.C. §1367 allows state tort claims to be heard 
by federal court but only if the complaint containing those state tort claims 
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contains an actionable federal cause of action. §1367 is available only to a 
plaintiff filing in federal court and not a defendant in state court. 
An attorney must to make a reasonable inquiry into the law prior taking 
actions such as removing a case to federal court. Barnard v. Sutliff, 1992, 846 
P.2d 1229. Here a plain reading of 1441 shows that removal was improper. A 
reasonable attorney would have recognized that 1441 requires a federal cause of 
action in the state case and that defamation, false light and false imprisonment are 
not federal claims. BYU's errant procedural maneuver to remove and tie up the 
case in federal court for 1 year under §1441 was sanctionable. 
Because Appellant should have won his motion for sanctions (See Motion 
to Correct Record - containing a copy of that motion) the award of attorney fees to 
BYU is improper. That being the case, Appellant's motion for sanctions could not 
be found improper and he himself sanctioned. It follows that Appellant's motion 
to Reconsider (R. 201) should not have been sanctioned by the trial court as 
occurred. R. 224-227. 
Further, Appellant was sanctioned under URCP Rule 11 and Appellant's 
motion for sanctions was not filed under URCP Rule 11. BYU's removal 
transferred the case to federal court. No state court proceedings could be filed by 
Appellant (or Appellee) under any URCP or state statute as the proceedings were 
stayed as a result of the removal. Appellant perhaps could have filed a FRCP 11 
motion in federal court but the case had already been ruled on that removal was 
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denied and it was simply a matter of getting the case remanded. Appellant timely 
filed the necessary motion to remand. So it is difficult to see how Appellant could 
be sanctioned under URCP 11 by the judge. 
Further, the additional sanctions imposed for the motion to reconsider can 
not be allowed as imposed in R. 226 as the motion to reconsider had merit. 
The judge held that sanctions were appropriate because Appellant had cited 
no authority for his motion. R. 195. Appellant does not see how that, if true, 
would merit the imposition of $2791.75 in penalties. It is well understood that a 
judge had authority to control the proceedings and that is the authority by which it 
was brought. Simply to not cite to or mention the common law as authority for the 
judge to entertain a motion for sanctions can not be grounds for such a sanction. 
Further, Appellant's proposed corrected record at 1 shows that the motion 
for sanctions cites to 28 U.S.C. §1441 showing that it did cite to authority to 
support it and that removal was improper. It is obvious from the record that a 
motion for sanctions was filed but for some reason it is now lost and Appellant 
asks that the court losing the motion not be held against Appellant. Appellant does 
not have a copy of that motion. Appellant has motioned to correct the record to 
include the missing document which was supplied by counsel for BYU. See 
Motion to Correct Record. 
II. 
The arrest warrant was improperly obtained and based on 
a sanction which unfair and therefore must be vacated 
15 
A. URCP 69 Does Not Exist 
BYU obtained the arrest warrant based on the alleged existence of URCP 
69. See R. 258. URCP 69 does not exist having been abrogated. See URCP 69. 
Because the statutory authority relied on is URCP 69 and that rule is non-
existent, the arrest warrant should be voided without further argument as a matter 
of law. 
B. URPC 3.3 Violated 
BYU went to the trial court to obtain the Order which would lead to the 
arrest warrant ex parte. That means Appellant was not present to be heard at the 
hearing. 
URPC 3.3 imposes a special duty to an attorney admitted to practice law in 
Utah to be forthcoming with all the information the judge needs to make a correct 
decision in an ex parte proceeding. 
(d) In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all 
material facts known to the lawyer that will enable the tribunal to make an 
informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse. 
See URPC 3.3(d). 
One material fact known to counsel for BYU was that Appellant was 
homeless in California, and did not have the financial means to travel to Utah for 
the hearing. In other words, BYU was guaranteed an arrest warrant for the 
Appellant by forcing him, ex parte, to attend in person a hearing in Utah so BYU 
could collect the $2791.75 and they preparing an Order which would cause a 
warrant for Appellant's arrest if he did not attend. 
BYU was fully informed by Appellant of that fact at a hearing before a 
federal judge in Utah where Appellant appeared by phone from California, See R. 
400:13-20. (Appellant informing the federal judge that he is homeless and barely 
had enough money for food from day to day.) Counsel for BYU were present at 
that hearing. R. 413. 
Appellant does not see how BYU's malicious abuse of the ex parte 
proceeding to obtain an arrest warrant can be tolerated. If informing a trial judge 
that a party does not have the means to get to the hearing - guaranteeing the arrest 
warrant - is not material then what is? BYU was unethical in what they did and 
they violated URPC 3.3(d) in their conduct and the arrest warrant must be vacated 
as a result, the $1822.50 sanction against Appellant for his complaining about the 
arrest warrant vacated, and BYU themselves sanctioned. 
C. Constitutionality of the Entire Process Is Questionable 
Aside from URCP 69 not existing and the professional conduct rules 
violated, Appellant questions the legality of allowing a person to be arrested for 
not attending a supplemental hearing. 
It would appear to be an entirely civil matter and for BYU to collect their 
$2791.75, assuming they deserved it, would necessitate them taking the Order to a 
California court and proceeding to collect the money that way. 
In other words, BYU stands in the shoes of a plaintiff seeking to collect a 
civil judgment or perhaps a plaintiff seeking damages from a defendant. The 
defendant can not be thrown in jail for not appearing in a civil case or not paying a 
civil judgment. The Utah Constitution generally forbids a person to be jailed for 
not paying a debt. Article I, Section 16. 
The U.S. Supreme Court distinguished between civil contempt for 
performing an act forbidden (punishable by fine, not imprisonment) and not 
performing a required act. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 
418,442-444(1911). 
In the words of the Supreme Court, assuming Appellant could be 
imprisoned for missing the hearing, then Appellant would have to "hold the key" 
to get out of jail by performing the act that the court requires. But the Appellant is 
homeless and at the time near penniless. Appellant would thus be imprisoned, or 
has an arrest warrant out for him, not because he is disobeying a court order, but 
because he can not afford to comply with the court order to travel to Utah for the 
hearing. Thus to arrest someone solely on account of their status of being too poor 
to comply with a court Order, assuming it were valid, would appear to offend our 
sense of due process of law. 
Related to the constitutionality of the arrest warrant and supplemental 
proceedings, Appellant notes that while preparing this brief it came to his attention 
that the signature of the judge for the Order leading to Appellant's arrest was 
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stamped. The signature of the trial judge appear at R. 452, 447, 421, 440, 488, 
483, 366, 112. Only R. 256 - the Order re: Arrest for the hearing appears out of 
place. 
What could be concluded is that a non-judicial officer decided the motion 
and stamped the judge's name on it which would appear to be a denial of due 
process of law. In other words, Orders which threaten a person with arrest can not 
be decided by a non-judicial officer. While the judge was the one who actually 
issued the arrest warrant, it appears improper to the Appellant if the judge's name 
were stamped on the supplemental proceeding Order stating Appellant would be 
arrested if not showing up at the hearing. 
D. The Trial Judge Aware of Appellant's Poverty. 
The trial court judge received a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (R. 
274) where Appellant, under oath, disclosed his financial condition and poverty. 
The judge should have rescinded the arrest warrant on that alone. The judge in 
fact signed the Order allowing Appellant to proceed in forma pauperis (R. 274 
signature at top of page) so the judge at least believed that Appellant was poor and 
that being the case should have rescinded it. Further, the purpose for the hearing 
was for Appellant to disclose all the assets he had in Utah which BYU could sell to 
collect their money. Yet the Appellant made, under oath, a statement showing he 
had no assets in Utah. The trial judge read that and was thus aware Appellant had 
no assets in Utah and the whole need for Appellant to be arrested and taken before 
judge Howard did not exist at that point as the judge had the exact information he 
sought. For these additional reasons the judge should have rescinded the 
arrest warrant. 
E. Sanctions Against Appellant for Related Rule 11 Motion Improper 
Appellant filed a Rule 11 motions for sanctions due to BYU's improper 
conduct as described in obtaining the arrest warrant. Yet in response to what 
Appellant considers egregious conduct by BYU, the judge simply sanctioned 
Appellant an additional $1,822.50. R. 481. Because BYU's conduct was not only 
wrongful but in violation of the rules of professional conduct, Appellant's motion 
for sanctions had merit and can not be penalized. Thus the $1,822.50 sanction 
needs dismissing. 
III. 
One Year Delay Caused By Defendant's Improper Removal Should Not Be 
Counted Against Appellant When Amending Complaint 
Briefly argued is that after initially allowing Appellant to amend the 
complaint (R. 173) a main for reversing that decision was that Appellant sought 
amendment after a 2 year delay and gave no reason for that delay. 
It turned out that the delay was only 1 Vi years and that 1 year of that delay 
was due as a direct result of the improper removal to federal court of the case. 
Thus the judge attempting to rely on the length of the delay in amending the 
complaint is misplaced as had the case not been improperly removed the amending 
of the complaint could have been done a year or so earlier. 
One other issue arose as a procedural matter when Appellant filed his 
motion to amend the complaint at R.108. Appellant notes he was unaware that his 
original motion to amend the complaint back at R. 31 as it apparently was mailed 
to a previous address. Nonetheless, the motion to further amend the complaint was 
made on Feb. 27 2004. BYU did not respond and Appellant filed the motion to 
submit for decision on March 16, 2004. URCP Rule 7 states that after briefing is 
complete the a motion to submit for decision is sent to the court. Because a motion 
to submit for decision signifies that briefing is complete, BYU should have been 
barred from submitting their opposition 2 months later on May 26, 2004. BYU 
gave no reason for their 2 month delay. Thus BYU caused additional delay of 
over 2 months in not timely responding to the motion to amend the complaint. 
IV. 
The complaint as amended, or as could be amended, states 
at least one actionable claims for relief. 
As for the right to amend the complaint, Appellant notes that one (1) year 
was lost in BYU improperly removing the case (September 26, 2002) to federal 
court. Once remanded (September 15, 2003), BYU waited 2 months after the 
notice to submit for decision to challenge it, then by time the judge finally decided 
the matter (R. 227) on March 23, 2005 an additional year had passed. Additionally 
much time was expended waiting for the appeal of the imposition of the sanctions 
to this Court and Appellant spent much time fighting the improper arrest warrant 
which BYU improperly obtained. 
Thus some leeway should be allowed to Appellant, he believes, in 
allowance to further amend the complaint under URCP 15 given the procedural 
background of the case. 
A. Negligence 
Appellant sought to amend the complaint to include a cause of action of 
negligence surrounding the actions of the night security officer divulging to a 
classmate, former roommate, and friend of the numerous things that the police 
dispatch had on record about Appellant. 
BYU would owe some duty to train its employees regarding the proper use 
of what could be termed confidential or protected information. At least it is not 
generally publicly available. Theoretically, if someone had a police band radio 
they could pick up that information. But here, Appellant's former roommate and 
classmate in the computer science class did not actively seek that information. It 
was imposed upon him by the student security guard. Thus BYU would have some 
duty to ensure that such information is not intentionally given out by one of their 
employees to hurt a student and damage and destroy his classmate relationships 
and their ability to succeed scholastically. They would likewise have a duty to 
properly supervise their employees. 
Certainly it is traumatizing to a student and damaging to their social and 
academic pursuits for an educational institution or its employees to single out one 
student and intentionally approach members of the students class and intentionally 
divulge negative information to their classmates. Certainly that damages a 
students reputation, their relations with peers and their ability to concentrate and 
succeed in school. For example, many times students work in study groups or ask 
questions of each other and when a student's character is ruined in the eyes of their 
classmates and is shunned by them as a result it harms the learning process. 
Further, many times, relationships developed during college continue 
professionally outside of school. 
Additionally, in the instant matter the damage was worse as the classmate 
was a former roommate and happened to be a friend of the Appellant. 
Here that duty was breached. As a result of that breach Appellant was 
injured in his ability to succeed in his classwork and his friendship with his former 
roommate was destroyed. Certainly for a university to allow its employees to 
approach classmates and intentionally demean them in such a way is intolerable. 
The negligence of BYU was the proximate cause of Appellant's injury. They owe 
some duty to train and supervise their students so such conduct does not happen. 
The complaint was filed within 1 year of the acts constituting the claim. 
The new cause of action could also relate back to the facts as originally outlined in 
the initial complaint. 
B. False Light 
Related to the incident is that the student security guard put Appellant in a 
false light making him appear as someone with a criminal background or someone 
to be shunned. Although incorporated by reference the acts of the security guard 
can explicitly be included in the false light claim. 
The newspaper article and internet article are also included in the false light 
claim. False light claims are not specifically listed and would fall under the catch 
all provision of the 4 year limitation. Appellant argues that if the legislature had 
intended False Light to be a 1 year claim they would have listed it as a 1 year 
limitation claim. A plain reading interpretation of the limitation statutes is what 
Appellant respectfully asks. 
C. Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
Appellant argues that BYU would owe Appellant a fiduciary duty as a 
school to keep certain matters private such as disciplinary matters. It would be a 
matter of fact-finding to determine whether any of the police dispatch information 
about Appellant would be considered school disciplinary information and thus 
whether any duty was breached. Some Discovery is needed. 
Much of the same argument for negligence could also be included for a 
Breach of Fiduciary Duty claim. 
D. Denial of Equal Protection - Utah Constitution 
The 2 articles in the school newspaper and internet site involved BYU 
acting in concert with their state actor police. That being the case Appellant is 
asking that the publication of the articles be treated as a denial of equal protection 
under the Utah State Constitution. Additionally, the student security officer was 
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supervised directly by the BYU police and he had access to state controlled 
information about Appellant and also could be considered a state actor for state 
constitution violation purposed. 
Equal protection violations could also include the incidents where 
Appellant was unreasonably detained both on and off campus by the BYU police 
when they detained him to determine his ID where no laws were being broken and 
similarly situated students are not treated by the state actor police like Appellant. 
E, Unreasonable Seizure - Utah Constitution 
While not part of the proposed amended complaint, the incidents where 
Appellant was detained without reasonable cause could be included in a claim for 
unreasonable seizure under the Utah Constitution. 
Certainly the BYU police asking the student security officers to call and 
report to the police when they spotted Appellant - a BYU student - so a the police 
could come and detain and question him, where Appellant was simply on campus 
like any other student is unreasonable. Also, stopping and detaining Appellant for 
the sole reason to get his ID where no laws where suspected of being broken is 
unreasonable. 
IV. 
Another Judge Requested On Remand 
Appellant did seek another judge via a motion of bias (R. 319) which was 
denied. R.383-381. At the time Appellant was unaware that Judge Howard was a 
BYU alumnus which might have influenced some decisions in the case. 
Mainly Appellant finds the number and quantity of sanctions to be 
excessive and in facts does not believe any of them were appropriate. Certainly it 
appears that the sanctioning was motivated in part by bias towards Appellant and 
believes those sanctions are sufficient to show a need for another judge. That 
along with the arrest warrant which the judge issued for Appellant, it having been 
improperly obtained and having little if any legal basis, along with the judge 
being aware it was improperly obtained and maintained in effect after the need for 
the hearing was obviated by Appellant's sworn affidavit under-oath to the court 
that he had no property in Utah, a new judge would appear proper. 
V. 
Conclusion and Relief Sought 
Appellant, based on the above argument, asks that the $4748.15 in sanctions 
be vacated, that the warrant for Appellant's arrest be vacated, and that the case be 
allowed to proceed in the trial court on those claims or proposed claims which 
state a cause of action and that a new trial judge be permitted. 
Additionally, BYU should have sanctions imposed as a result of their 
improper removal of the case to federal court, causing a prejudicial one (1) year 
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delay in the case and as a result of their improper conduct in obtaining an arrest 
warrant for the Appellant. 
Respectfully, 
DATED December 2, 2006 
Aaron Raiser 
I certify that a true and correct copy of (% CQS^^M 
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David M. Kono (Counsel for Appellee) 
3865 S. Wasatch Blvd. Suite 300 
Salt Lake Citiy,Ut 84109 
Aaron Raiser 
97 
